2023

Atty. Adan, counsel for defendants in a criminal case for FOPDBPI, failed to appear during a scheduled hearing. The Respondent Judge ordered and ruled that Atty. Adan’s absence thereto is to be construed as a waiver on defense’s part to cross examine prosecution’s witness.  gacor4d toto macau link gacor toto online daftar amintoto bandar togel terpercaya ixplay agen slot gacor slot thailand slot gacor akun slot gacor togel slot amintoto slot mahjong toto macau slot gacor 4d wso slot toto slot akun gacor4d slot qris situs toto angka akurat toto macau toto slot For his part, and during the presentation of the prosecution’s second witness, Atty. Adan explained that he consulted a doctor during the date of the hearing because of the pain he experienced in his eyes. However, the Judge denied Atty. Adan’s MFR to the earlier order primarily because the medcert he presented was not notarized. Moreover, the accused invoked their right to cross-examine an adverse witness which was violated when the Judge construed their counsel’s absence as a waiver of said right. They also assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 10(b) of JA Rule, whose effect was the same as that of the Judge’s order. On the other hand, the Judge said that she did not apply JA Rule in her order, but instead the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. ISSUE: Did Counsel’s failure to attend the hearing amounted to a waiver of the constitutional right to cross examine witnesses? RULING: NO. The right of petitioners to cross-examine Nenita, being a basic and fundamental right, should be seen as paramount. While the State has the right to due process, such right should not prevail over the accused’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses when it is not shown that the accused applied machinations to unreasonably deny the prosecution of its ability to prove its case.  Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the JA Rule, not being the lis mota of the case, was not passed upon. The Court ultimately resolved that the order was valid insofar as its ground is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, NOT the JA Rule.

Agnes, the petitioner, and Joe-Ar, the respondent, met at a restaurant in Bacolod City. Their relationship immediately developed.  slot gacor 4d situs toto slot gacor 4d agen toto amintoto login slot gacor 4d link bandar togel toto togel restoslot4d situs slot gacor togel online slot gacor 4d situs toto idn toto mahjong ways 2 situs toto gacor4d gacor4d agen toto slot situs gacor4d gacor4d slot gacor 4d angka jitu situs toto situs toto Shortly after they met, Agnes, who was just 18 at the time, was asked by her mother to go to her brother’s house and live there. Joe-Ar, who was 21 at the time, went with her. Her brother’s house was small, so Agnes and Joe-Ar had to share a bedroom. Because of this, Agnes’ family assumed that they had intimate relations and urged them to get married, which they did. After they got married, they had a child. At this point, they were living with Joe-Ar’s in laws, to which Agnes objected to as she does not like her in-laws. True enough, they did not treat her well. As their marriage developed, their relationship grew sour; Joe-Ar had a bad temper and would physically assault Agnes. Agnes moved to Cebu to escape from the abuse and to work. When she moved, she found out that Joe-Ar fooled around with different women and even had a child with one of them. Joe-Ar also failed to support their son. Hence, she filed a case for nullity of marriage under Article 36. RTC granted the petition, stating that Joe-Ar’s personality disorder, as established by the psychological report, was the cause of his incapacity to comply with marital obligations. OSG filed an MR then appealed to the CA, questioning the reliance of the RTC on the psychological report, and that it was biased since only Agnes and her sister were interviewed without any independent witnesses. CA reversed the RTC, stating that the psych, the report, and the testimony of the psychologist cannot be given credence as he was not able to interview Joe-Ar. On juridical antecedence Juridical antecedence is established by showing that the psychological incapacity exists at the time of the celebration, even if it only manifests during the marriage. There must be a TESTIMONY to describe the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. The petitioner must show that the incapacity “IN ALL REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD” already existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. NOTE: Here, although not discussed, I think this was established by the testimony of Agnes who lived with Joe-Ar and his family as well as the psychologist. The SC said, the psychological report observed that Joe-Ar’s family background and environment nurtured and led to this type of personality. Who should the psychologist interview? The personal examination of the psychologically incapacitated spouse is not indispensable in establishing Art. 36 cases. It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses. It is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person’s psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. Here, the persons who testified were Agnes, her sister, and the psychiatrist. These were deemed sufficient by the SC. SC said: it is only reasonable that a psychological report is based on the testimony of the petitioning spouse since she is the one who had closely observed and interacted with her partner. However, SC also clarified that evidence should also come from other sources. Here, Dr. Gerong’s psychological assessment is not only based on the petitioner, but also on another source: petitioner’s sister. Thus, psychological assessments based on testimonies of the petitioner and her sister may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the totality of the evidence establishes the private respondent’s psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the marriage is warranted. The SC considered all of the evidence adduced as sufficient to show the psychological incapacity of Joe-Ar, hence the marriage was dissolved.

Marlon Agapito (Agapito) was employed by Aeroplus Multi-Services (Aeroplus) as a housekeeper. restoslot4d slot gacor amintoto restoslot4d restoslot4d amintoto restoslot4d amintoto link toto slot restoslot totokita3 restoslot4d restoslot4d amintoto idn slot restoslot4d amintoto slotgacor4d slot gacor 4d amintoto gacor4d slot gacor 4d restoslot4d amintoto amintoto amintoto During a meeting, Agapito asked his immediate supervisor George Constantino (Constantino) about the unfair treatment he was getting in relation to his tardiness. Constantino, already irate, uttered, “Masyado kang ma-reklamo, kung ayaw niyo ang patakaran ko lumayas ka dito!” When Agapito reported this incident to Aeroplus’ personnel office, Constantino found out about it and gave him a letter memorandum for insubordination. Agapito was later suspended for 2 weeks. When Agapito reported back to work, Darrel Mendoza (Mendoza), Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel, told him, “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” When Agapito asked for an explanation, Mendoza shot back with, “Basta tanggal ka na!” Consequently, Agapito Filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and money claims. He argues that: LA: Aeroplus liable for illegal dismissal The statements of Aeroplus’ OIC-Personnel Mendoza — “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!” followed by his directive for petitioner to get out of the office leave no doubt that petitioner was indeed dismissed outright without due process. NLRC: Reversed; uttered words do not constituted terminationCA: Affirmed NLRC Did the words Constantino and Mendoza utter amounted to illegal dismissal? YES. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Here, Agapito categorically recounted that Aeroplus OIC-Personnel Mendoza said “Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya tanggal ka na!” and “Basta tanggal ka na!,” immediately followed by an unequivocal order for petitioners to get out of the office, speak for themselves. It was an outright termination of employment without just cause and due process. Accordingly, Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is found liable for the illegal dismissal of Agapito and was ordered to pay backwages, separation pay, SIL, and damages.

Republic of the Philippines v. Spouses Jovito and Kathleen Bercede, G.R. No. 214223, reminds us that case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by dear and convincing evidence. Sps. Bercede (Jovito and Kathleen) claims that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 4275. The property was allegedly purchased from Kathleen’s parents, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Kathleen’s parents, in turn, bought from Kathleen’s grandmother through an absolute deed of sale. Kathleen’s grandmother acquired the same from the heirs of the original owner, by way of an extrajudicial settlement. Thus, the subject property was still under the name of its original owner. Sps. Bercede, before the RTC, prayed for the reconstitution of OCT No. 4275. They averred that the original copy of the title (which should have been on file with the Register of Deeds) and the owner’s duplicate have both been lost and destroyed. The following documents were presented in support of the petition: a photocopy of the OCT, Tax Declaration, Tax Clearance, EJS and all the deeds of absolute sale, a Certification from the LRA-RD stating that the certificate of title covering the subject property was no longer available (either that it was burned or lost during the World War), and a Certification from the DENR which indicated the geographic position and plane coordinates of the cadastral survey covering the subject property. The Republic sought to dismiss the petition, arguing: The petition was granted by the RTC. LRA Certification confirmed the loss or destruction of the certificate of title. The spouses have shown that they have an interest over the property through the subsequent transfers, which culminated in their ownership. The Tax Dec, in relation to the photocopy of the OCT, means that the title is still in force and that the area and boundaries of the property are the same as those contained in OCT No. 4275. The republic appealed, interposing, among others the supposed intercalations and erasures on the photocopy of the OCT even if the RA 26 requires that the certificate of title should be free from apparent erasures and alterations. However, their appeal was denied by the CA. The Republic maintains that the spouses failed to prove that the owner’s duplicate of OCT was also missing, because the certificate by the LRA refers solely to the original supposed to be on its file, and resorting to a mere photocopy is unjustified. THE PETITION WAS GRANTED. The SC reversed the CA and the RTC, denying the petition for reconstitution. The purpose of reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction. In Denila v. Republic, the SC held that substantial compliance with jurisdictional requirements is not enough, because the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law. Both the RTC and the CA did not make any categorical ruling on whether the spouses have established that they failed to secure or find the documents mentioned paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 to justify their resort to a photocopy of OCT No. 4275. In fact, when Kathleen testified, it was shown that their only basis for seeking reconstitution of their title is that it was lost and destroyed based on the June 3, 2008 Certification issued by the LRA that the said OCT is not on their file. Based on this fact alone, the petition for reconstitution should have been dismissed by the RTC and should not have prospered. On this score, case law instructs that the unavailability or loss of the source documents listed higher in the list than the one being offered as the source for a petition for reconstitution must be proved by credible and convincing evidence. Therefore, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of ‘other documents’ as evidence in substitution is allowed.

People of the Philippines v. Antonio M. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, reminds us that the GSIS Act of 1997 punishes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well any employees of these offices who are responsible for collecting payments due to the GSIS but willingly fail or refuse to do so. Antonio M. Talaue, Efren C. Guiyab and Florante A. Galasinao were the mayor, treasurer, and municipal accountant, respectively, of Sto. Tomas, Isabela. They were accused by the GSIS of failing to remit the GSIS premium contributions of the employees working for the municipality’s government office, which is considered as a criminal act under the R.A. 8291, of the GSIS Act of 1997. During the trial, the prosecution presented Araceli Santos (Santos) as one of its witnesses. Santos is the Branch Manager of GSIS, Cauayan, Isabela Branch. She found that the municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of interests, from the period of 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004. She further stated that the agency head, treasurer, and accountant are in charge of remitting the contributions to the GSIS, and that the Mayor should have received the notices and demand letters and relayed its contents to the mentioned officers accordingly. Meanwhile, the defense presented accused Galasinao as its witness, who claimed he was not mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipal employees. He claimed that the Municipal Treasurer, co-accused Guiyab, was responsible for remitting the GSIS contributions as it is the latter’s duty to manage the municipality’s funds. However, Guiyab had already passed away during the pendency of the case. Talaue was also presented by the defense as a witness and claimed to have told Guiyab to start paying the GSIS while the case was still ongoing, and that funds were already allocated for this purpose. He also claimed that payments have already been made to the GSIS, and that the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 118. Talaue concluded that he was not criminally liable, as the MOA, which supposedly supersedes all previous agreements, converted the municipality’s obligation to the GSIS as a loan instead of an unpaid obligation. This loan is said to be paid on a scheduled basis and subject to the reconciliation of accounts and data.  The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Galasinao based on reasonable doubt, but found Talaue guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision.  The GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well as any employees responsible for the collection of payments due the GSIS, who refuse, fail, or delay said accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time they have become due and demandable.  According to the Supreme Court, a municipal government is still part of the national government, and as the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Talaue is undoubtedly considered the head of office. The task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is, therefore, as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the collection of premium contributions. Congress purposely included heads of office in the list of those liable in order to create a sense of urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to their subordinates.  Unfortunately, Talaue’s testimony revealed a pattern of passing the buck to the municipal treasurer and contenting himself with repeating his oral instructions to make arrangements with the GSIS. It was only during the pendency of the civil case filed by the GSIS against him, his co-accused, and the municipality, that he instructed the treasurer to pay the municipality’s obligations, albeit in partial amounts.  Talaue’s failure to take drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability betrays his nonchalance at the treasurer’s apparent lack of sense of urgency in complying with the law which appellant himself is equally, if not primarily, bound to observe. It cannot, therefore, be said that he did not intend to fail in remitting the contributions. His attitude toward the situation and toward the ineptitude of the municipal treasurer was the very recipe for failure. Moreover, while it may have been through Talaue’s initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA, said agreement only finds relevance with respect to the civil liability of the municipality and of the accused. This makes him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the GSIS Act of 1997, as he and the other employees tasked with collecting the GSIS contributions are responsible for ensuring the premiums are paid and/or sent to the GSIS on time.