Facts
Linney Tangarorang (Linney) filed a petition before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ramer Tangarorang (Ramer) under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Linney and Ramer had a child, Sharemahlyne, born on September 9, 2006. They married on April 12, 2007, shortly after Sharemahlyne’s birth. Throughout their relationship, Ramer allegedly subjected Linney and Sharemahlyne to physical, emotional, and verbal abuse. He was also addicted to alcohol and gambling, engaged in illicit affairs, and relied financially on his parents.
Linney eventually filed a case for violation of R.A. 9262 (Anti-VAWC) against Ramer. In retaliation, Ramer took Sharemahlyne and threatened not to return her unless Linney dropped the VAWC case, although he later returned the child and apologized. Despite this, the spouses separated sometime in 2018.
In support of her Petition, Linney submitted their marriage certificate, Sharemahlyne’s birth certificate with the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity signed by Ramer, and a Psychological Report issued by psychologist Mita R. Gupana-Lim, who diagnosed Ramer with narcissistic personality disorder with co-occurring signs of impulse disorder, rendering him incapable of performing essential marital obligations. Linney also presented the judicial affidavits of herself, Sharemahlyne, and Gupana-Lim.
The RTC found the petition sufficient, ordered a summons by publication, and directed the City Prosecutor to investigate collusion, which was ruled out. At Pre-Trial, the issues were limited to: (1) whether Ramer was psychologically incapacitated; and (2) whether the marriage should be declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. During the trial, Linney presented her evidence, while the OSG manifested that it would not present controverting evidence, and Ramer did not participate.
The RTC rendered judgment granting Linney’s petition and declaring her marriage to Ramer void ab initio. In granting Linney’s petition, the RTC found clear and convincing evidence of Ramer’s psychological incapacity, which was corroborated by the testimonies of individuals who personally witnessed Ramer’s demeanor from his childhood until marriage. However, while the RTC declared the marriage void, it also ruled that Sharemahlyne was an illegitimate child, without providing any explanation for such a conclusion.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, the OSG filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration to assail only the part of the ruling that declared Sharemahlyne to be illegitimate. In response, Linney filed a Comment to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, claiming that Sharemahlyne is an illegitimate child because she was born before the parties’ marriage. With her status as an illegitimate child, Linney averred that Sharemahlyne’s custody solely belongs to her.
The RTC denied the foregoing Motion in the assailed Order, ruling that Sharemahlyne remains an illegitimate child since she was born before the parties’ marriage. There was likewise no annotation in her birth certificate that she underwent the legitimation process.
Hence, the OSG filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring Sharemahlyne an illegitimate child of respondents Linney and Ramer.
Ruling
Yes, the RTC gravely erred in declaring Sharemahlyne to be an illegitimate child of respondents Linney and Ramer.
At the outset, Article 165 of the Family Code provides that “[c]hildren conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in [the Family] Code.” However, children may be legitimated by a subsequent valid marriage of their parents under Articles 177 and 178 of the same Code, if their parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other at the time of their conception.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents are the biological parents of Sharemahlyne. As shown in her Certificate of Live Birth, she was born on September 9, 2006, to respondents who were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. While psychological incapacity was later found to have rendered respondent Ramer incapable of fulfilling his essential marital obligations, such incapacity is not an impediment under the law that would disqualify him from contracting marriage. Thus, with their marriage taking effect on April 12, 2007, Sharemahlyne had been legitimated.
Considering that “a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all,” the nullity of the marriage, as a general rule, will make the child’s status illegitimate from conception. However, Article 54 of the Family Code provides for exceptions:
“Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.”
Based on the foregoing provision, there are two instances when children born outside of valid marriages would still be considered legitimate so that the declaration of nullity of marriage would not result in a change of their status: (1) when the parent/s is/are declared psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code; and (2) when the child is conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 of the Family Code, but the parent/s has/have not complied with the requirements of Article 52 of the Family Code.
For void marriages under Article 53 of the Family Code, the language of Article 54 of the Family Code requires that children be conceived or born within the subsequent marriage to be considered legitimate. However, for void marriages under Article 36, Article 54 of the Family Code did not distinguish between a child born prior to the marriage and a child born during the subsisting marriage. All the provision requires for legitimacy is that the child must be conceived or born prior to the judgment of absolute nullity under Article 36.
It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Relevantly, the lack of distinction between the class of legitimate children born in wedlock and the class of legitimated children born out of wedlock under Article 54, in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, finds conformity with Article 179, which states that “legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.” In fact, the legitimate status of legitimate children retroacts to the time of their birth pursuant to Article 180 of the Family Code, further eliminating any perceived difference between legitimate and legitimated children. Indeed, legitimation “puts a legitimated child completely and fully on equal footing with children born in lawful wedlock.”
It would also not be amiss to point out that the Family Code does not provide for a scenario where a legitimated child may revert to illegitimacy. This is in keeping with the principle that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. Considering that ” in the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status,” the law protects the presumption of legitimacy, which is “based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.” It would thus be absurd to relegate children “to the status of illegitimacy, when they are already enjoying the rights accorded to legitimated children.” To entertain such a situation would be anathema to the intent and purpose of the law in prioritizing the best interests of the child.
Considering the foregoing reasons, there is no substantial distinction between legitimate and legitimated children for purposes of determining the legitimacy of children of marriages later declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. A declaration of nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses under Article 36 should not affect the status of the children in accordance with Article 54 of the Family Code.
In the assailed Order, the RTC incorrectly ruled that Sharemahlyne remains an illegitimate child under Article 165 of the Family Code, as her legitimation was not reflected in her birth registry. Given that the legitimacy status of a child is conferred by the Family Code, a substantive law, the lack of annotation in the birth certificate as to the subsequent marriage of the parents of the child shall not affect such status. Indeed, the formal requirement of annotating the legitimation is a mere administrative procedure that cannot impair substantive rights.
Accordingly, Article 54 of the Family Code entitled Sharemahlyne to retain her legitimacy status as a legal consequence of the respondents’ marriage. The RTC, in granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, contravened the law in declaring her to be an illegitimate child as a consequence of the nullification.
Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that Linney may have been impelled by a desire to claim sole custody of Sharemahlyne, as Ramer previously tried to keep their daughter away from her due to the VAWC case that she filed against him. It bears stressing, however, that legitimacy is presumed to be more favorable to Sharemahlyne, and Article 54 in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code prescribes the child’s legitimate status. Hence, the more appropriate action for the mother under these circumstances would be to file a separate petition to seek sole custody of her daughter.
All told, the RTC rulings were bereft of basis in declaring Sharemahlyne to be illegitimate. Since her legitimacy status is not affected by the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, the RTC must be reversed insofar as it declared Sharemahlyne to be an illegitimate child of the respondents.