September 2023

People of the Philippines v. Antonio M. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, reminds us that the GSIS Act of 1997 punishes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well any employees of these offices who are responsible for collecting payments due to the GSIS but willingly fail or refuse to do so. Antonio M. Talaue, Efren C. Guiyab and Florante A. Galasinao were the mayor, treasurer, and municipal accountant, respectively, of Sto. Tomas, Isabela. They were accused by the GSIS of failing to remit the GSIS premium contributions of the employees working for the municipality’s government office, which is considered as a criminal act under the R.A. 8291, of the GSIS Act of 1997. During the trial, the prosecution presented Araceli Santos (Santos) as one of its witnesses. Santos is the Branch Manager of GSIS, Cauayan, Isabela Branch. She found that the municipal government failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of interests, from the period of 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004. She further stated that the agency head, treasurer, and accountant are in charge of remitting the contributions to the GSIS, and that the Mayor should have received the notices and demand letters and relayed its contents to the mentioned officers accordingly. Meanwhile, the defense presented accused Galasinao as its witness, who claimed he was not mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipal employees. He claimed that the Municipal Treasurer, co-accused Guiyab, was responsible for remitting the GSIS contributions as it is the latter’s duty to manage the municipality’s funds. However, Guiyab had already passed away during the pendency of the case. Talaue was also presented by the defense as a witness and claimed to have told Guiyab to start paying the GSIS while the case was still ongoing, and that funds were already allocated for this purpose. He also claimed that payments have already been made to the GSIS, and that the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 118. Talaue concluded that he was not criminally liable, as the MOA, which supposedly supersedes all previous agreements, converted the municipality’s obligation to the GSIS as a loan instead of an unpaid obligation. This loan is said to be paid on a scheduled basis and subject to the reconciliation of accounts and data.  The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Galasinao based on reasonable doubt, but found Talaue guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision.  The GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the national government, as well as any employees responsible for the collection of payments due the GSIS, who refuse, fail, or delay said accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time they have become due and demandable.  According to the Supreme Court, a municipal government is still part of the national government, and as the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Talaue is undoubtedly considered the head of office. The task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is, therefore, as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the collection of premium contributions. Congress purposely included heads of office in the list of those liable in order to create a sense of urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to their subordinates.  Unfortunately, Talaue’s testimony revealed a pattern of passing the buck to the municipal treasurer and contenting himself with repeating his oral instructions to make arrangements with the GSIS. It was only during the pendency of the civil case filed by the GSIS against him, his co-accused, and the municipality, that he instructed the treasurer to pay the municipality’s obligations, albeit in partial amounts.  Talaue’s failure to take drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability betrays his nonchalance at the treasurer’s apparent lack of sense of urgency in complying with the law which appellant himself is equally, if not primarily, bound to observe. It cannot, therefore, be said that he did not intend to fail in remitting the contributions. His attitude toward the situation and toward the ineptitude of the municipal treasurer was the very recipe for failure. Moreover, while it may have been through Talaue’s initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA, said agreement only finds relevance with respect to the civil liability of the municipality and of the accused. This makes him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the GSIS Act of 1997, as he and the other employees tasked with collecting the GSIS contributions are responsible for ensuring the premiums are paid and/or sent to the GSIS on time.

The case of People of the Philippines v. Samiah S. Abdulah, G.R. No. 243941, reminds us that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 provides steps in the chain of custody that must be strictly followed in order to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of seized items. On November 20, 2014, at 1:30 PM, an informant reported to the District Anti-Illegal Drug of the Eastern Police District about two girls selling illegal drugs in Marikina City. Police Officer 3 Erich Joel Temporal (PO3 Temporal) was tasked to go with the informant to investigate. At the area, the informant introduced PO3 Temporal to EB and Samiah S. Abdulah (Abdulah), who were using code names at the time. The informant told the sellers that he was interested in buying shabu; however, EB and Abdulah told PO3 Temporal to return the next day, as they did not have shabu at the time. A buy-bust team was formed accordingly, and PO3 Temporal was given a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money. The team returned to the target area the next day. Abdulah then approached PO3 Temporal and asked about his order. The officer handed her the P500.00 bill, which she then passed to EB. EB placed the money in a sling bag and retrieved from it a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which she handed to the officer. At this, PO3 immediately introduced himself as a police officer and apprehended Abdulah and EB. He seized the sling bag from EB, recovering the buy-bust money and another sachet of white crystalline substance. Believing that the area was unsafe for being “a Muslim area,” the team brought Abdulah and EB to the barangay hall where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized items. This was witnessed by Barangay Tanod Reynaldo Garcia, Barangay Kagawad Francisco delos Santos, Abdulah, and EB. Abdulah and a child in conflict with law (CICL) identified as “EB” were charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and the trial court found the accused Samiah Abdulah and CICL EB guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Aggrieved, Abdulah appealed the decision and argued that the arresting authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. She pointed out that the inventory and photographs were taken only at the barangay hall, without the presence of representatives from the media or the National Prosecution Service. The Supreme Court agreed with the contentions of Abdulah and it reversed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court ruled that the chain of custody requirements as written in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures the integrity of the seized items. The integrity of the seized items cannot be trusted if there are procedural lapses in the chain of custody. In this case, the buy-bust team did not mark the seized drugs immediately after Abdulah and EB’s arrest. Instead, they did so once they got to the barangay hall; they had refused to do it in the area of arrest because it was “a muslim area.” The prosecutor’s attempt to justify the procedure lapse is too weak and enforces a bigoted view towards Muslim people. The team also failed to bring representatives of the media and the National Prosecution Service to serve as witnesses when they market the seized items; in fact, the team did not exert any effort into calling in these representatives. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to justify noncompliance with the law’s mandate. As long as there is still reasonable doubt on the accused’s culpability, he or she should continue to be presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence cannot be overcome by merely relying on the weakness of the defense, and the prosecution’s duty to prove the accused’s criminal liability must rise or fall upon its own merits. Thus, Samiah S. Absulah was ACQUITTED by the Supreme Court for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She was then released from detention.

Ditiangkin, et. al. vs Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 246892, reminds that when the status of an employment is in dispute, the employer bears the burden to prove that the person whose service it pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular employee with or without fixed terms.  In February 2016, Chrisden Cabrera Ditiangkin and several others were hired as riders by Lazada E-Services Philippines, Inc. They were primarily tasked to pick up items from sellers and deliver them to Lazada’s warehouse. Each of them signed an Independent Contractor Agreement which states that they will be paid P1,200.00 per day as service fee. The contractor states that they are engaged for a period of one year and that they’ll be using their privately-owned motorcycles for their trips.  Sometime in January 2017, the riders were told that they will no longer be given any schedules. They still reported for work for three days until they learned that their routes were given to other employees. The riders filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission against Lazada for illegal dismissal. Lazada argued that the riders were not regular employees but independent contractors. It also explained that after the surge of deliveries during the Christmas season, the demand decreased to its normal rate by January. Because of this, it had to reorganize the schedule to ensure all the riders will have a trip. It argued that the riders misunderstood the temporary team assignments as termination. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lazada, while the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint. Despite this, the riders filed a Petition before the Supreme Court, asserting that they are regular employees and that there is an employer-employee relationship present. This is proven through the presence of all four factors of the four-fold test, which includes the following: the employer’s selection and engagement of the employee; the payment of wages; the power to dismiss; and the power to control the employee’s conduct. Furthermore, the riders also claimed that there is economic dependence in their employment with Lazada. Because they work twelve hours a day and six days a week, they are unable to gain other employment. This made them solely reliant on their employment with Lazada for income. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the riders and said Lazada failed to discharge their burden of proving that the riders were independent contractors, and that they didn’t fall under any of the categories of independent contractors.  The Court also found that all four factors of the four-fold test were indeed present. First, petitioners were directly employed by Lazada instead of engaged by a third-party; second, they received their salaries of P1,200.00 for each day of service; third, Lazada stated in the contract that it had the power to dismiss the riders; and fourth, Lazada had control over the means and methods of the performance of the riders’ work. It required the accomplishment of a route sheet and the submission of trip tickets and incident reports. The riders all risked a penalty of P500.00 if an item was lost, on top of its actual value. Finally, the court held that the services performed by the riders were integral to Lazada’s business, and that there is economic dependence in their employment with the company. As a result, this Petition for Review was GRANTED. The Supreme Court ordered Lazada to reinstate Ditiangkin et al to their former positions and pay their full back wages and other benefits.

Jarupay vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429 is an example of how psychological violence can be inflicted on someone through marital infidelity. By committing marital infidelity, the accused would be inflicting emotional anguish and mental suffering to his or her spouse. The complainant, AAA, and the accused, Jaime Araza y Jarupay, were married on October 5, 1989. AAA had no marital issues with Araza until he went to Zamboanga City for their networking business. One day, AAA received a text message stating that Araza was having an affair with their best friend. She went to Zamboanga to see for herself whether it was true, and was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman named Tessie Luy Fabillar. AAA instituted a complaint against Araza and his alleged mistress for concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza came to live with AAA again. However, it wasn’t long before Araza left once more. Out of desperation, AAA sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again.  Based on the NBI agent’s investigation, Araza and his mistress, Fabillar, had been living together as husband and wife. Three children were born out of their affair. The truth caused AAA emotional and psychological suffering. She suffered from insomnia and asthma. At the time of the case, she was still taking anti-depressants and sleeping pills to cope with the psychological turmoil brought about by Araza’s marital infidelity. She then filed a case against Araza for Violence Against Women and Children on the grounds of psychological violence caused by his infidelity. Araza is fully liable for the crime of Violence against Women and their Children. One of the grounds for VAWC is psychological violence, as stated in Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. The law requires that the emotional anguish and mental suffering of the victim be proven. This is done by requiring the testimony of the victim to be presented in court.  The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt by proving that he committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible, and her emotional anguish and mental suffering came to the point where even her health condition was adversely affected. As a result, the RTC found Araza guilty of the crime of violence against women under Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The CA denied Araza’s appeal and motion for reconsideration.