
Facts
Spouses Eliodor Q. Perez and Adelita M. Perez were the registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot 2, Block 9 of the consolidation subdivision plan with a total area of 350 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-7396. The spouses had two children, Avegail and Adonis Perez. Prior to his marriage with Adelita, Eliodoro was married and had several children, one of whom was Nicxon Perez Sr., who sired petitioner Nicxon Jr.
On October 29, 1995, a sworn statement denominated as Renounciation and Waiver of Rights (RWR) was executed by Adelita in favor of her husband Eliodoro. Said instrument was inscribed on TCT No. T-7396 on July 20, 2004. On July 27, 2004, Eliodoro donated the said parcel of land to Nicxon without the conformity of Adelita. TCT No. T-7396 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 12547 was issued to Nicxon. Subsequently, a Real Estate Mortgage was executed by Nicxon in favor of Rolando Ramos on November 16, 2009.
On February 1, 2005, Eliodoro filed against Adelita a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 73. On June 15, 2005, RTC-Branch 73 rendered a Decision (Marriage Nullity Decision) declaring the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita void ab initio.
Eliodoro died on June 28, 2008. On April 14, 2009, an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver was executed and signed by his legitimate and compulsory heirs. On September 30, 2010, x Avegail Perez-Senerpida brought an action before RTC-Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 135-0-2010 for Annulment of Donation and Title with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Nicxon. She contended that he is one of the children of late Eliodoro and Adelita. She claimed that the RWR and DoD are clearly prejudicial to her interest because it affected her future inheritance or legitime. Thus, the said documents, together with TCT No. T-12547 in the name of Nicxon, should be annulled.
The RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the annulment of the Renunciation and Waiver of Rights, annulment of Deed of Donation, nullification of TCT No. T-12547, cancellation by the Registry of Deeds of TCT No. T-12547, and issuance of another title over the subject property in Eliodoro’s name. Nicxon appealed to the CA.
The CA in its Decision dated April 7, 2017 found the appeal filed by Nicxon bereft of merit. The CA noted that at the time of the donation made by Eliodoro in favor of his grandson Nicxon, he was still legally married to Adelita given that Eliodoro died on June 28, 2008. As such, Eliodoro should have first secured the conformity of his wife, Adelita, as expressly required under Article 98 of the Family Code, which provides that: “Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other.” Nucxon moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this Petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the ruling of the CA and the RTC violated the rule on res judicata when they did not treat as final and executory the earlier Decision in the declaration of nullity of marriage case (Civil Case No. 44-0-200532); (2) Whether the CA and the RTC erred in ruling that the property regime of Eliodoro and Adelita was still covered by the ACP despite the final decision declaring their marriage void ab initio; (3) Whether the DoD executed by Eliodoro in favor of Nicxon is valid.
Ruling
(1) and (2) YES. The CA and RTC erred in not treating as final and executory the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita, and in ruling that the property regime of Eliodoro and Adelita was still covered by ACP.
Both the RTC and the CA committed a patent error in their factual finding in this case that the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita remained valid and subsisting until Eliodoro’s death on June 28, 2008. While the RTC Decision was rendered on February 24, 2015, or prior to the CA Decision in the Annulment of Judgment Petition dated September 22, 2015, the RTC could not have mistaken the March 5, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 120119 in connection with the Annulment of Judgment Petition to mean reception of further evidence in the second petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita that was filed by the former because that Resolution emanated from the CA in its disposition of the Annulment of Judgment Petition. In other words, if the RTC entertained any doubt, it should have verified from Branch 75 what the hearing for reception of further evidence was all about. After all Branch 72 (the RTC of this case) and Branch 75 are both located in Olongapo City. Another option of the RTC would have been to await the outcome of the Annulment of Judgment Petition filed by Adelita with the CA inasmuch as the resolution of the issue in the said petition — the annulment of the Marriage Nullity Decision — was inextricably linked with the instant case.
On the part of the CA, at the time it rendered its Decision on April 7, 2017 in the present case, the CA Decision in the Annulment of Judgment Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 120119 had already been rendered more than a year earlier, or on September 22, 2015. A mere perusal of the March 5, 2012 Resolution of the CA issued in connection with the Annulment of Judgment Petition would have made the CA to be circumspect and make a verification as to whether the RTC’s finding in this case in relation to that March 5, 2012 Resolution was factually accurate.
Based on the Court’s mere reading of the CA Decision in the Annulment of Judgment Petition, the factual mistake of the RTC and the CA in this case becomes readily patent, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the instant Rule 45 certiorari Petition.
Since the Marriage Nullity Decision became final and executory on July 6, 2005, as confirmed with finality in the CA Decision in the Annulment of Judgment Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 120119, prior to Eliodoro’s death, then the marriage between him and Adelita, which was celebrated on December 10, 1975 at Infanta, Pangasinan, was null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code as declared in the Marriage Nullity Decision.
Since the marriage between Adelita and Eliodoro was judicially decreed to be void ab initio or from the beginning, the RTC and the CA here in this case clearly erred in their ruling that the ACP regime governed their property relations.
Parenthetically, and to digress a moment, even if their marriage was not declared void from the beginning, the RTC and the CA would still have erred because the applicable property regime should have been the conjugal partnership of gains (CPG). Pursuant to Article 105 of the Family Code, the provisions of Chapter 4, Conjugal Partnership of Gains, shall apply to CPG already established before the effectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights. Since the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was celebrated on December 10, 1975 and the CPG was then the applicable property regime between validly married spouses, absent any contract executed before the marriage, then that property regime continued.
Nicxon is thus correct in his contention that the lower courts in the present case erred in applying Article 89 of the Family Code, which provides in part that: “No waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.” Unquestionably, Article 89 cannot justify the nullification of Adelita’s RWR since Adelita and Eliodoro were not validly married.
Nicxon correctly cites Article 147 of the Family Code as the applicable provision and the rules on co-ownership govern the property acquired during the cohabitation or “common law” marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita.
(3) NO. The DoD is void. Under a regime of separation of property, pursuant to Article 145 of the Family Code, each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or own estate, without need of the consent of the other. Understandably, each spouse can donate or alienate onerously his or her own estate without the need of obtaining the other spouse’s consent. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, which covers the exclusive cohabitation of a man and woman as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, there is unfortunately no direct prohibition on donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other.
It is true that Article 147 provides that the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership and pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code, in a co-ownership: “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved[; but the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
With Article 493 of the Civil Code as basis, Eliodoro could have alienated onerously or gratuitously his part or share in the subject property to Nicxon without the consent of Adelita, who was half co-owner thereof, and the alienation would have been limited to the half portion allotted to Eliodoro upon termination of the co-ownership or partition.
Even the donation by Eliodoro of the entire subject property to Nicxon, without the consent of Adelita, could produce valid effect under Article 493, which would be limited to his share. Consequently, if Article 493 of the Civil Code were to be applied, the donation to Nicxon of the subject property could only affect the one-half share of Eliodoro and the one-half share of Adelita could not have been transferred to Nicxon by virtue of the DoD.
However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede, and must yield to, Article 147 of the Family Code, which expressly mandates that: “Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.”
Given the above express prohibition of a party to the cohabitation to encumber or alienate by acts inter vivos even his or her share in the property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other party until after the termination thereof under Article 147, then the donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other can only be but void. The rules on ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the undivided share of the disposing party. The donation is simply void.
If a disposition of a party’s share in the property under special co ownership created by virtue of Article 147 without the consent of the other party is proscribed by law, then, and with more reason, should the disposition of the entire property under such special co-ownership by a party without the other party’s consent be considered void as well.
To conclude, while the Court finds merit in Nicxon’s contention that the lower courts in the present case erred in finding that the property regime between Adelita and Eliodoro was governed by the ACP as their marriage subsisted until Eliodoro died, the DoD to him of the subject property is, nonetheless, void as this is a prohibited disposition under Article 147 of the Family Code.
