Sadsad Tamesis Legal and Accountancy Firm

Is a Third-Party Buyer’s Possession Enough to Stop the Ministerial Issuance of a Writ of Possession? | G.R. No. 200991

Is a Third-Party Buyer’s Possession Enough to Stop the Ministerial Issuance of a Writ of Possession? | G.R. No. 200991 | PHOTO: Karol G / Pexels

Facts

New San Jose Builders Inc. (NSJBI) and the Government Service Insurance System (respondent) entered into a Loan Agreement on 10 December 1997. NSJBI borrowed an amount of Php 600 million to finance the completion of two (2) housing projects, and to purchase a lot for construction of more housing projects. As security for the loan, NSJBI mortgaged three (3) parcels of land with existing improvements: 365 lots with existing low-cost houses at Mary Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, 102 condominium units at St. John Condominium at Scout Rallos, Quezon City (mortgaged properties), and rights over 240 condominium units in GSIS Metro Homes.

Under the loan agreement, NSJBI shall not alienate sell, dispose of, mortgage, or in any manner encumber the mortgaged properties or any portion thereof without the prior consent of the respondent. However, the parties also agreed that NSJBI may continue to sell the mortgaged properties subject to the condition that the net proceeds from the sales should be exclusively used in the recoupment of the loan. The parties further stipulated that in case of non-compliance with the conditions and stipulations agreed upon, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage, either judicially or extrajudicially, in accordance with the applicable provisions of law.

The mortgage was annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) of the mortgaged properties on 10 December 1997. Among those mortgaged pursuant to the Loan Agreement was Unit 205 in St. John Condominium at Scout Rallos, Quezon City (Unit 205), allegedly sold by NSJBI to the Spouses Wilfredo and Dominica Rosario (petitioners).

NSJBI defaulted in the payment of the loan. On 31 March 2003, respondent applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. Subsequently, an auction sale was conducted on 17 June 2003, where respondent was the highest bidder.

Upon failure of NSJBI to exercise its right of redemption, the titles/ownership of the property were consolidated and the Register of Deeds cancelled the corresponding TCTs and CTCs in favor of respondent. Claiming that NSJBI continued in possession of the said foreclosed properties, respondent demanded NSJBI to vacate the foreclosed properties but to no avail. Hence, on 23 August 2006, respondent filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession against NSJBI and all occupants of the foreclosed properties before the RTC.

NSBJI and its buyers, petitioners, Atty. Donardo S. Donato, Marcelino Delos Reyes and Carlitos Escueta, filed their pleadings-in-intervention. Respondent filed separate motions to expunge the pleadings-in-intervention.

On 07 April 2008, the RTC issued a Resolution, resolving to: 1) grant the motions for intervention, including that of petitioners; 2) treat the motion for leave to take judicial notice of Marcelino Delos Reyes as a motion to intervene and grant the same; and 3) grant respondent’s application for a writ of possession as against NSJBI but only as to unsold condominium units and lots that are not in possession of third-party buyers.

The CA granted respondent’s petition and reversed the RTC resolutions dated 07 April 2008 and 11 June 2009 of the RTC. It found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting petitioner’s motion for intervention in ex-parte proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession. The CA also ruled that the RTC erred in restraining the implementation of the writ of possession against petitioners since they are not third parties who are in adverse possession of the foreclosed property.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for allowing petitioners to intervene in respondent’s ex-parte application for a writ of possession, and exempting from its implementation Unit 205 possessed by petitioners.

Ruling

YES. As a general rule, the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the foreclosed property after the lapse of the redemption period and no redemption is made. As owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, including the right to possess the same, or jus possidendi. After consolidation of the ownership and transfer of TCT in the purchaser’s name, a writ of possession will issue as a matter of course even without the necessity of a bond.

As an exception, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession ceases when there are third-parties who are actually holding the mortgaged property adversely to the judgment debtor. Sec. 33 of Rule 39, made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135.

Jurisprudence teaches that when there are third-party possessors of the property, the RTC should instead conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession. However, for this exception to apply, it is not enough that the property is in the possession of a third party, it must also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor.

The Court deemed that the third-party’s possession should be respected as it raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and under Article 433 of the Civil Code, a person who contests such disputable presumption must resort to judicial processes for the recovery of the property. However, for purposes of resolving the propriety of issuing a writ of possession, the trial court must conduct a summary hearing to determine the nature of the possession of third-party claimants. For it may be that the actual possessor is privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. The trial court shall then deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant.

PD No. 1038 was enacted to fortify the security of tenure of tenant-­tillers who were being unlawfully ousted in their lands and reinforce earlier laws providing for security of tenure for agricultural tenants. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees, which they value as life itself, as deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.

As will be discussed, this Court finds that individuals who buy condominium units or subdivision lots from developers are also entitled to the same treatment. Thus, writs of possession issued upon the application of mortgagee banks or financial institutions should exclude units or lots actually occupied by individual buyers.

Herein respondent should not be allowed to summarily divest petitioners of their possession of Unit 205. The protection afforded to a subdivision lot buyer under PD No. 957 should not be defeated, particularly by someone who is not a mortgagee in good faith. In this case, respondent knew that the mortgaged properties form part of a condominium project, which are within the purview of PD No. 957. It was aware that the loaned amounts were to be used for the development of NSJBI’s various projects. This is clear from Sec. 6.2 of the Loan Agreement where respondent consented to the sale of the condominiums subject to the condition that the net proceeds from the sale be exclusively used in the recoupment of the loan.

Under the circumstances, respondent knew the possibility and assumed the risk that some of the condominium units would eventually be sold to individual buyers. Hence, it cannot now claim that it was unaware of the individual buyers’ rights, nor should it be allowed to bypass the same, through a summary application for a writ of possession without according them the opportunity to be heard. The RTC thus correctly allowed petitioners and the other condominium unit buyers to intervene and be excluded from the issuance of the writ of possession. Respondent’s supposed superior right over occupied condominium units should instead be determined in a full-blown proceeding where all the parties’ claims are ventilated and scrutinized by the courts.

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